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The usefulness of the device in its new environment will depend
largely upon the attitude of the courts. If the device is to be loaded
down with arbitrary and technical restrictions, it will serve no very
useful purpose in the enlarged field. If, on the other hand, the courts
will disregard the ancient and often arbitrary distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity and will permit the Rule to operate
in all cases to which it justly and soundly may be applied, it will
serve its intended purpose.
Today this statement could be applied equally well to the revised rule.
To date, decisions have indicated that courts will take a liberal approach
to the rule and allow the class action to serve its intended purpose in future
litigation.
RONALD

E.

YOUNG

PROCEDURAL COMPROMISE AND CONTEMPT: FEASIBLE
ALTERNATIVES IN THE FAIR TRIAL VERSUS
FREE PRESS CONTROVERSY
The viability of the Bill of Rights1 is continually tested by the modern
world of instantaneous communication and constantly expanding news media.
While safeguarding essential liberties, the Bill of Rights occasionally imposes
contradictory or at least competing requirements. For example, the development of a protected and seemingly omnipresent press has made it increasingly difficult to provide the sixth amendment guarantees of a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury, of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.2 Many commentators have asserted that prejudicial pretrial publicity in criminal cases jeopardizes the defendants' right
to an impartial jury trial, and have urged that remedial steps be taken to
overcome the effect of such publicityA It is also argued that available pro1. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
3. The dichotomy between the right of an accused to a fair trial and the constitutional

guarantee of freedom of the press is frequently discussed: e.g., Goodhart, Newspapers and
Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1935); Comment, The Impartial
Jury-20th Century Dilemma: Some Solutions to the Conflict Between Free Press and
Fair Trial, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306 (1966); Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper:
Analysis and Proposed, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217 (1962); Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press:
The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Duplicity on the Juror's Ability To Be Impartial; A
Plea for Reform, 38 S. CAL. L. Rrv. 672 (1965); Note, Free Press and Fair Trial: An
Evolving Controversy, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 660 (1967).
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cedural safeguards4 are inherently inadequate and that a truly impartial jury
can never be found in certain well-publicized cases.
This note will analyze the factors involved in the fair trial-free press
controversy, discuss and evaluate the remedial procedures presently utilized,
and suggest possible modifications to improve the guarantee of fair and
impartial jury trials.
THE BASIC PROBLEM-THE FAIR TRIAL VERSUS FREE PRESS CONTROVERSY

Recent cases suggest the possibility of a direct causal relationship between
press reports and jury verdicts, with the outcome of more sensational (and
hence newsworthy) cases more likely influenced by journalists and broadcasters. 5 In the past, problems arose only with trials involving matters of
grave and widespread concern. 6 Today, however, high media saturation often
makes it difficult to obtain impartial juries even for less sensational trials,
although crimes having a notorious or heinous nature continue to inspire
maximum news coverage.
Defining an "ImpartialJury"
An early attempt to define an impartial jury was made by Chief Justice
7
John Marshall in his discussion of the Aaron Burr conspiracy trial. The
ideal jury, in Marshall's view, based its verdict solely on evidence presented
in court and was free from "those strong and deep impressions which close
the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them." s
However, Marshall did distinguish between deep impressions and "light
impressions, which may fairly be presumed to yield to the testimony that
may be offered."0 Thus, a truly impartial juror has been characterized as a
person whose mind is free from the dominating influences of relevant

4.

Commonly employed safeguards are contempt proceedings, voir dire examinations,

challenges to the jury, cautionary instructions, and motions for continuance and change
of venue.
5. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 884 U.S. 333 (1966) (discussed in notes 87-41 infra and
accompanying text); Irvin v. Dowd, 866 U.S. 717 (1961). Extensive reporting of major
crimes has been especially prevalent in recent years. Examples are the coverage of the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the Jack Ruby murder trial (convicted slayer
of Lee Harvey Oswald), and the proceedings against Sirhan B. Sirhan (convicted slayer of
Robert Kennedy).
6. Burr's Trial, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 470 (1807), discussed the difficulty of securing impartiality in the conspiracy trial of a former Vice President of the United States. The
trial of Lincoln's assassins has long been criticized for its unfair and prejudicial taint,
especially to Mrs. Mary Surratt. See J. BINGHAM, ARGUMENT OF JOHN A. BINGHAM, SPECIAL
JUDGE ADVOCATE IN REPLY TO DEFENsE OF MARY E. SURRATr (1865).

7. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 470 (1807).
8.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878), citing Burr's Trial, I Burr Trial

416 (1807).
9.

Id.
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knowledge and information acquired outside the courtroom.10
Unfortunately, Marshall's guidelines did not adequately delineate the
true scope of the phrase "impartial jury"; instead, they raised the new problems of distinguishing between "light" and "deep" impressions and determining which extrajudicial publicity and information has an adverse effect
upon prospective jurors. At least in theory, "a juror who has formed an
opinion cannot be impartial.""l In practice, however, only opinions of an unwavering and uncompromising nature will render a person unfit for jury
duty.12 The obvious reason that "impartiality" has not been adequately defined is that it is a term descriptive of a state of mind, rather than a technical
concept. "For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference," Chief Justice Hughes wrote, "the Constitution lays down no
particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial
formula."13

Reynolds v. United States14 introduced the concept of the "impossible
standard" by recognizing that in many criminal prosecutions it is impossible
to find jurors who have not formed in advance some impression concerning
the case or the issues involved. In Irvin v. Dowd,1 5 the Supreme Court reasserted this concept. "To hold that . . . any preconceived notion as to the

guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the
presumption

of

.

.

. impartiality, would

be to establish an impossible

standard."' 6 Thus, total ignorance of the facts and issues is not required of
a juror; and, even if he admits preforming an opinion, a juror is not disqualified on this basis alone.1' The capability of a prospective juror to disavow his prior beliefs is determinative, not the existence of preformed
opinions.' Therefore, it is maintained that "the right to be tried by an
10. Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Duplicity
on the Juror's Ability To Be Impartial; A Plea for Reform, 38 S. CAL. L. Rv. 672, 673
(1965).

11. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878).
12. Id. at 155-56. "Every opinion which he may entertain need not necessarily [be
impartial] .... In these days [1878] of newspaper enterprise and universal education, every
case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all
the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best
fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or
some opinion in respect to its merits." Id.
13. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936).
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15.

366 U.S. 717 (1961).

16. Id. at 723.
17. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Beck v. United States, 298 F.2d 622
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962). In Holt a juror stated that he had no opinion
other than that derived from the papers, and that evidence would change it very easily,
although it would take some evidence to remove it. He thought he could try the case solely
upon the evidence, fairly and impartially. Holt v. United States, supra at 248. The juror was
impanelled after defense counsel's challenge was denied.
18. Cases cited note 17 supra. "The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be
reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not
by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Often the test used is whether the juror can swear that he will be
able to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial. But see text ac-
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impartial jury is relative rather than absolute."' 9 Courts are satisfied if defendants receive fair trials, even if not perfect ones. 20 An accused is not
entitled to a trial by a jury free from all preconceived opinions; but he has
the right to a trial by jurors whose preformed opinions about guilt are unlikely to result in a miscarriage of justice.
Although this concession detracts somewhat from the "inviolable" right
to a jury free of prejudice, excitement, passion, or tyrannical power,2' the
Supreme Court has assumed that the retention of minimal preconceptions
works no prejudice against the defendant.2 2 While publicity surrounding
criminal prosecutions is generally disfavored by the courts, the mere presence
of it will not necessitate a mistrial unless an atmosphere saturated by bias,
hatred, and prejudice against the defendant is created.23 Thus, under present
standards, empanelling an "impartial" jury is impossible only when prejudicial publicity infiltrates the entire community and develops a sense of com24
munity prejudice against the accused.
The standard thus raises a presumption of partiality only when the
publicity complained of creates such a deep impression that it would blind
a juror to contradictory evidence offered at trial.25 Although this definition
of "impartial" is far from concrete, a more precise one is unlikely to be
formulated. Trial judges retain the discretion to determine whether a prospective juror is impartial; and, in order to rebut the presumption of impartiality, counsel must show not only that prejudicial publicity existed, but

companying notes 4243 infra.
19. Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Duplicity
on the Juror's Ability To Be Impartial; A Plea for Reform, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 672, 674
(1965).
20. "[The defendant] had a fair trial and as has been commonly recognized, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Hansen v. United States, 393 F.2d 763,
770 (8th Cir. 1968), citing United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579, 586 (7th
Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 809 (1949).
21. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940); Rees v. United States, 95 F.2d 784,
790 (4th Cir. 1938); 'Wood v. United States, 83 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir.), reted on other grounds,
299 U.S. 123 (1936).
22. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
23. United States v. Grassia, 354 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1965), cited the court of appeals'
disapproval of the intensification of news articles both prior and subsequent to the arrest
of the accused. The court found, however, that the publicity was not sufficient to make it
so plainly impossible to find an impartial jury as to require a mistrial. See also Seals v.
Mississippi, 208 Miss. 236, 44 So. 2d 61 (1950).
24. McWilliams v. United States, 394 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1044
(1968); United States v. Corallo, 284 F. Supp. 240 (D.C.N.Y. 1968); People v. Jenkins, 10
Mich. App. 257, 159 N.W.2d 225 (1968). Cf. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.
1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), where popular prejudice against the Communist Party was
evident, but failure of the defendant to show local or temporary prejudice indicated that
an impartial jury could be selected. See also Bary v. United States, 248 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.
1957). Requiring the accused to appear in court in his prison garb will prejudice the
defendant by denying him a fair and impartial jury trial. United States ex rel. Diamond v.
Social Serv. Dep't, 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
25. United States ex rel. Stickler v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 992 (1966).
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also that it reached and actually influenced the jurors. 26 This standard
27
applies to juries in both federal and state cases.
The Emergence of a Powerful Press and Its Effects on the Impartial Jury
The growth of mass-circulation news media in the United States has
been viewed with apprehension by the judiciary. 28 Newspapers have expanded their circulation and influence to reach nearly every home in
America.29 With the advent of radio and television, the probability that
most citizens will be informed of controversial or noteworthy criminal prosecutions has greatly increased. The percentage of prospective jurors who
have not formed opinions prior to trial has undoubtedly declined correspondingly.
While some courts have sensed the prejudicial potentialities of an
irresponsible press, others have applauded the altruistic aims of responsible
journalism3 ° and cherished the guarantee of a free and unregulated press.
News media perform a vital function in the administration of justice, and
factual news reporting does not in itself create a prejudicial atmosphere at
criminal proceedings.31 Only when the media cease to be objective 32 do they
produce prejudice so actual and inherent as to necessitate censure. 33 When
abuse occurs, however, courts should adopt ample measures to safeguard the
accused from harassment by unduly prejudicial publicity.3 4 On the other
hand, defendants should not, as a general procedure, be isolated from all
news coverage for such isolation would encourage secret trials, the elimina26. Janko v. United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961); United States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 961 (1966); Massicot v. United States, 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
27. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961), noted: "Although this Court has said
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand the use of jury trials in a State's criminal
procedure, Fay v.... New York, 332 U.S. 261 [1942] . .. Palko v.... Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 [1937] . . . every State has constitutionally provided trial by jury. See Columbia University Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Index Digest of State Constitutions 578-579
(1959)" See also Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948).
28. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
29. Nationally, 1.03 daily newspapers are delivered per family and 0.82 Sunday newspapers are circulated per household. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF
THE UNITED STATES 503 (1969).
30. "The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
31. United States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963).
32. At times the loss of objectivity is apparently done to serve the demands of an inquisitive public (while sacrificing the interests of the accused). Also involved is another
sixth amendment guarantee -the right to a public trial. It has been clarified to mean
the right of the accused to have a fair, speedy, and public trial, not the right of the public
at large to know the histories of the parties involved in the prosecution and a detailed
account of the court proceedings. "[The] right to a public trial is a right of the accused, and
of the accused only." Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1959).
33. 'Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966).
34. Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
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tion of which is one of the purposes of a free and responsible press. While
courts have implored news agencies to treat all cases with circumspection
and objective fairness, prejudicial press coverage has not infrequently
occurred. Sheppard v. Maxwell,35 a well-known case involving the trial of
Dr. Sam Sheppard for the murder of his wife, provides an example.
The record in Sheppard is replete with examples of publicity easily
capable of prejudicing prospective jurors against the accused. Innumerable
articles and editorials discussed Sheppard personally, while others involved
even the jury in the deluge of publicity.
Twenty-five days before the case was set, seventy-five veniremen were
called as prospective jurors. All three Cleveland newspapers published
the names and addresses of the veniremen. As a consequence, anonymous
letters and telephone calls, as well as calls from friends, regarding the
impending prosecution were received by all of the prospective jurors.36
A rule of court prohibited picture taking in the court, but no restraints were put on the photographers during recesses, which were taken
once each morning and afternoon, with a longer period for lunch.37
The day before the verdict was rendered-while the jurors were at
lunch and sequestered by two bailiffs-the jury was separated into two
groups to pose for photographs that appeared in the newspapers.38
During the trial, motions by defense counsel for a change of venue, continuance, and a mistrial were denied.39 In Irvin v. Dowd40 the press solicited
curbstone opinions concerning both the guilt or innocence of the accused
and the punishment he should receive if convicted. The results were broadcast repeatedly over local radio stations. These tactics resulted in a mistrial.
Just as the mere existence of prejudicial publicity will not conclusively
render a trial invalid,," statements by a juror that he would "not be influ-

35. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), reversed a twelve-year old Ohio conviction of Sheppard, who allegedly had murdered his wife, on the grounds that the
Cleveland news media had repeatedly subjected the accused to intense prejudicial scrutiny,
rendering an impartial jury impossible.
36. Id. at 342.
37. Id. at 344.

38. Id. at M4.
39. Id. at 348.
40. This case involved the trial of a man accused of murdering six people in Indiana.
The Court found that the defendant was denied a trial by an impartial jury due to the
tremendous amount of hostile publicity he had received 'in the months prior to trial.
Newspapers delved into Irvin's history in detail during the seven months leading up to the
trial date, including "reference to crimes committed when a juvenile, his convictions for

arson almost 20 years previously, for burglary and by a court-martial on AWOL charges
during the war." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725 (1961).
41. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text. It is difficult for the defense to
establish that a fair trial cannot be obtained in the county where the alleged crime was
committed. State v. Beckus involved the following facts: During an armed robbery a state
trooper was fatally wounded and Beckus was charged with the crime. Meanwhile, a fund
was established for the family of the deceased trooper, with the Governor of the state

serving as fund chairman. Ninety-two jurors were rejected on voir dire, and although all
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decide the case only on the evidence
against petitioner as a result of the
conclusive. 4 3 In Irvin the Supreme
44
the fair trial-free press dichotomy:

This court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal
justice must be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the press, properly conceived. The Court
has not yet decided that, while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors or potential
jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.
Earlier in the opinion, the Court had questioned by implication the common
contention that the mere existence of an opinion acquired through the newspapers is insufficient to disqualify a juror. 45 The theory that such opinions
do not affect a juror's impartiality fails to conclusively withstand psychological
scrutiny.46 Experiments indicate that the first impression concerning another's
"central dimension of personality"4 7 will often become an unyielding belief
that survives even after confrontation with the subject himself. This occurs
even when the subject's personality apparently conflicts with the first impres48
sion report.
A study in which an unknown lecturer was invited to speak to three
sections of a psychology class is illustrative. A few days before the lecturer
was to appear, a biographical sketch was distributed to the members of the
the selected jurors had read newspaper accounts of the crime, and some had contributed
to the fund, the court ruled that a fair trial was held because the newspaper reports and
the television and radio broadcasts were not of a prejudicial character. State v. Beckus, 229
A.2d 316 (Me.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 870 (1967). A ruling that jurors would not normally
be exposed to prejudicial articles published 100 miles away has been held to be proper.
Aiuppa v. United States, 393 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Hall v. United States, 396
F.2d 428 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968).
42. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959).
43. Accord Singer v. State, 107 So. 2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959), contending that: "A juror's
statement that he can and will return a verdict according to the evidence submitted and
the law announced at the trial is not determinative of his competence [i.e. impartiality],
if it appears from other statements made by him or from other evidence that he is not
possessed of a state of mind which will enable him to do so."
44. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 727. "The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent
that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the average man."
46. Kelley, The Warm-Cold Variable in First Impressions of Persons, 18 J. PERSONALITY
431 (1950).
47. Prior information or labels attached to a person will make a difference in first
impressions. Ethnic or racial slurs are examples. A study by S.E. Asch demonstrated that
certain crucial labels can change the entire impression previously created. "Asch read to
his subjects a list of adjectives which purportedly described a particular person. He then
asked them to characterize that person. He found that the inclusion in the list of what
he called central qualities, such as 'warm' as opposed to 'cold,' produced a widespread
change in the entire impression. . . . Peripheral qualities (such as 'polite' versus 'blunt')
did not produce effects as strong as those produced by the central qualities." Id. at 431-42.
48. Comment, supra note 19, at 678.
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class. One-half of each section received resumes with the followng description:
"People who know him consider him to be a very warm person, industrious,
critical, practical, and determined." The other half received a slightly different characterization: "People who know him consider him to be a rather cold
person, industrious, critical, practical, and determined." Following a lecture
and a question-answer session, each student was requested to complete a
questionnaire concerning the speaker and his personality, grading him on
fifteen different attributes. Ratings given by the two halves differed markedly
even though they had all observed the same man giving the same performance.
Among the differences were the following: the students who had received
the "warm" description tended to rate the speaker as considerate of others,
informed, sociable, popular, and humorous, while the students receiving the
"cold" description found him to be self-centered, formal, unsociable, unpopular, and humorless. 49
Prospective jurors armed with first impression reports from the newspapers
probably undergo similar attitudinal structuring. It is a hollow tribute to
the news media that most people believe the written or spoken words they
50
convey, for "press reports are not always accurate and are seldom complete."
Even minimal press coverage may jeopardize the right to a fair and impartial
jury trial when it creates lasting first impressions. Procedural measures intended to correct such impressions should be broadly utilized and constantly
reevaluated in an attempt to counteract and, if possible, prevent prejudicial
pretrial publicity.
OFFSETING THE EFFECT OF PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY

Procedural solutions have not recognized the subconscious psychological
burden that exposure to prejudicial publicity places upon prospective jurors
when exposed to prejudicial publicity. Yet it can be inferred 1 that even
minimal information concerning the moral character of a criminal defendant
may decisively affect the jury verdict. Nonetheless, present remedies-challenges to the fitness of jurors, continuance, change of venue, and others-can
adequately resolve the problem of fair trial versus free press if they are more
extensively utilized by the courts.
Challenging the Juiy
The devices of challenge for cause52 and peremptory challenge53 attempt

49. Kelley, note 46 supra.
50.
51.

Singer v. State, 107 So. 2d 7, 17 (Fla. 1959).
See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.

52.

FLA. STAT.

§913.03 (1967): "A challenge for cause to an individual juror may be

made only on the ground: . . . That the juror has a state of mind in reference to the
cause or to the defendant or to the person alleged to have been injured by the offense
charged, or to the person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, which will
prevent him from acting with impartiality; but the formation of an opinion or impression
regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground
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to guarantee an impartial jury by eliminating prejudiced jurors. "While
challenges for cause permit rejection of prospective jurors on the ground of
provable and legally cognizable evidence of partiality, peremptories permit
further rejection for real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated
and proved." 4 Because of the tendency of the press to present detailed commentary concerning civil and criminal actions prior to trial, the preliminary
examination has become increasingly important. Biases and prejudices
created in the minds of prospective jurors by press coverage may be uncovered in preliminary examinations, leaving the jurors susceptible to challenge55 On the other hand, the preliminary or voir dire examination may
not be utilized by an interrogating attorney to prejudice the entire jury panel.
For this reason it has been suggested that voir dire examination be conducted
by the judge rather than by the attorneys., 6 However, wide latitude is permitted concerning the nature and type of questions that may be asked; s7 and

of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence ....
"
53. FLA. STAT. §913.08 (1967): "The state and the defendant shall each be allowed the
following number of peremptory challenges: (1) Ten, if the offense charged is punishable
by death or imprisonment for life; (2) Six, if the offense charged is a felony not punishable by death or imprisonment for life; (3) Three, if the offense charged is a misdemeanor;
(4) If two or more defendants are jointly tried each defendant shall be allowed the
number of peremptory challenges specified above and in such case the state shall be
allowed as many challenges as are allowed to all of the defendants."
54.

Note, Selection of Jurors by Voir Dire Examination and Challenge, 58 YALE L.J.

638 (1949).
55. Normally, however, a challenge to a juror's qualifications will not be upheld if he
states that he is able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court,
even if he has formed an opinion concerning the case as a result of pretrial publicity.
"The ability of the average prospective juror untrained in the act of judgment not to
allow such preconceived opinions to color his reception of the evidence is subject to
question. Such a juror is not subject to challenge for cause, however, although there is
nothing to prevent the defendant from using his peremptory challenge to exclude such a
juror." A. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: THEIR FUNCTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS, AND SELECTIONS
71 (1958), Cf. United States v. Woods, 364 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 972
(1966). See also notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
56. "The voir dire examination which is the basis for the challenges may be used
by lawyers as an opportunity to influence or prejudice the entire jury panel rather than
being used for its basic aim, the production of an impartial jury . . . . If the aim is to
secure an impartial jury, there is more reason for the examination of the jury to be
conducted by the court who is impartial than to leave it to attorneys who are bound to
attempt to use every opportunity they may have, to secure a favorable jury rather than to
secure an impartial one." A. VANDERBILT, supra note 55, at 73-74.
"The court conducted voir dire examination would effectively minimize attempts by
counsel to prejudice the jury in the pre-trial stage, since the examination of prospective
jurors would be placed in the hands of a neutral third party, the judge. And the exercise
of challenges for causes by the court avoids the risk of prejudicing jurors by a party's unsuccessful challenge." Note, supra note 54, at 644.
57. "A very wide latitude of examination by the court is allowable and indeed often
necessary to bring to light the mental attitude of the proposed juror to one of the parties
that it may be determined if such attitude renders the proposed juror unqualified." Cross

v. State, 89 Fla. 212, 213, 103 So. 636, 637 (1925).
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if the interrogation reveals material prejudice because of excessive pretrial
publicity, a challenge for cause will lie.58
Challenges to individual jurors must be made before the jury is sworn;
however, the court may, on a showing of good cause, permit a challenge after
the swearing of the jury but before any evidence is presented. 59 Generally,
the denial of a challenge for cause based on prejudicial pretrial publicity is
within the discretion of the trial judge. 60 The possibility that the judge
may err in his discretion is mitigated by the statutory allowance for peremptory challenge without a showing of good cause. 61 Thus, failure on the part
of the defendant to utilize all available peremptory challenges has been viewed
as indicating satisfaction with the jury. 62 This rationale fails, however, when
all peremptory challenges have been exhausted and the seating of prospective
jurors rests solely within the discretion of the trial judge. It is urged, therefore, that courts liberally disallow the impanelling of prospective jurors who
have been challenged for cause on grounds of prejudice resulting from pretrial
publicity.
Continuance
Delays in the criminal process are expensive and risk the possible death
or loss of memory of witnesses and principals. Since such delays are caused
in part from the use of continuances, 63 this procedural attempt at guaranteeing impartial juries is not favored. Here too, the trial judge has wide dis-

58. "[1jf the juror's opinion is not fixed and settled, and he is not warped by prejudice,
but the opinions entertained by him are only such as would spring naturally from public
rumor or newspaper reports, and his mind is open to the impression it may. receive from
the evidence, he is competent." Blackwell v. State, 101 Fla. 997, 1000, 132 So. 468, 510
(1931), citing O'Conner v. State, 9 Fla. 215 (1860). See also United States v. Ragland, 375
F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1967); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
59. FLA. STAT. §913.04 (1967).
60. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 146 (1878); Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So.
392 (1937); Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254, 175 So. 213 (1937). The fact that veniremen were
patients of a slain physician was not a sufficient ground for challenge. McCollum v. State, 74
So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1954); cf Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959), where the denial of a
challenge for cause was held to be reversible error. The prospective juror in Singer had
stated on voir dire that he was not sure he could render a verdict without being influenced
by opinions he had formed from reading about the case as well as his knowledge of the
family of the victim. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.

717 (1961).
61. FLA. STAT. §913.08 (1967). See list of peremptory challenges listed in note 53 supra.
The number of peremptory challenges is not within the discretion of the judge, but is
controlled by the legislature. Cf. State v. Persinger, 62 Wash. 2d 362, 382 P.2d 497 (1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 187 (1964).
62. Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865 (1922).
63. FLA. STAT. §916.02 (1967): "(1) A continuance within the meaning of this chapter
is the postponement of a cause for any period of time. (2) The court on the application
of either party or on its own motion may in its discretion for good cause grant a continuance."
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cretion,64 and the decision of the trial court is reversible only on a showing

of "palpable" abuse.6 5
Some courts have been reluctant to recognize affidavits for continuance
because of an aggravated apprehension that their purpose is merely dilatory. 66
The denial of a motion for continuance has been upheld where the defendant
failed to avail himself of the opportunity to interrogate the jurors intensively
and did not move for a change of venue. 67 As with challenges, the mere fact
that jurors have read newspaper articles critical of the defendant does not,
by itself, establish bias entitling defendant to a postponement.68 Continuances have not always been granted even where prejudicial publicity has
assumed gigantic proportions and has effectively denied the accused a fair
trial anywhere in the state on the date set for the proceedings. In the Brinks
robbery case 69 the court said: "It does not follow, however, that the inevitable
result [of the extensive publicity] is that the defendants must be released,
because they can never constitutionally be tried." '7 0 Normally, a motion for
a continuance should be granted when noticeable hostility has been generated
by the press or other sources. In such instances, it is reversible error to deny
such a motion7 1 The defendant must show, however, that he will derive

64. See FLA. R.

CRIN

P. 1.19 0(g). See also Russ, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,

in FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION §3.10

(ser. 1968).

65. "Motions for a continuance are in the discretion of the trial court, and the action
of that court on them will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of that
discretion to the disadvantage of the accused, or whereby his rights may have been jeopardized." Moore v. State, 59 Fla. 23, 30, 52 So. 971, 974 (1910). A motion for continuance has
been denied where the veniremen came from the other side of the county (30-40 miles),
thereby, in the opinion of the court, possessing only a moderate interest in the case as
a news item. Roberts v. State, 72 Fla. 132, 72 So. 649 (1916). See also Acree v. State, 153
Fla. 561, 15 So. 2d 262 (1944).
66. Hysler v. State, 132 Fla. 209, 181 So. 354 (1938); Jacques v. State 86, Fla. 137, 97 So.
380 (1923); Hall v. State, 70 Fla. 48, 69 So. 692 (1915).
67.
Motions by defendant union officials for continuance were denied on the grounds
that constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury would be protected by a
proper utilization of voir dire examination. United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1957). Courts have held that no prejudice results from the denial of requests for
continuance where no challenge of a juror was refused. Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d
105 (8th Cir. 1953), accord, United States v. Shaffner, 291 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 915 (1961); North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1952), afJ'd, 346 U.S. 932
(1954).
68. See United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
69. The Brinks case involved the trial of a group of conspirators who had allegedly
stolen over $4 million. Defense counsel argued that since the prejudicial publicity would
outlast the time of the trial and it was present throughout the state, a motion for continuance or a change of venue would be ineffectual and any attempt at securing an impartial jury would be futile. Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 159 N.E.2d 870,
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959).
70. Id. at 501, 159 N.E.2d at 881.
71. Hostile publicity may emanate from congressional hearings as well as from the
news media. "[T]he prejudicial effect of the pretrial publicity in this case was only a byproduct of the conscientious performance by the legislative committee of the investigative
function constitutionally confided to the Congress." Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107,
114 (1st Cir. 1952).
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the benefit of attenuated prejudice if the continuance is granted; that is,
that a continuance will result in a fair trial.72 Since news items have at least
a lingering psychological effect, 73 defense motions based upon prejudicial
pretrial publicity should be liberally entertained.
Change of Venue
In addition to trial by an impartial jury, the Constitution guarantees
the right to be tried in the state and district where the crime was committed.7 4
Thus, a motion for a change of venue 75 necessarily declares an intent to
sacrifice this right in exchange for a trial by an impartial jury.76 The motion
for change of venue, which may be advanced by either party, is generally
sustained only when it is impossible to secure an impartial jury in the county
7
where the crime was committedW
Even where considerable feeling against the accused causes the selection
of a jury to be time-consuming, denial of a motion for change of venue
usually will not be a reversible abuse of discretion.78 As in motions for continuance and voir dire challenges, the mere existence of newspaper articles
is not a sufficient ground for a change of venue,7 9 and an application for a

72. In Delaney the district judge denied a continuance because the delay could not
reasonably be beneficial until after the upcoming national elections. The First Circuit
reversed because "if assurance of a fair trial would necessitate that the trial of the case
be postponed until after the election, then we think the law required no less than that."
Id. at 115.
73. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
74. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See also Deeb v. State, 131 Fla. 362, 179 So. 894 (1937).
75. FLA. STAT. §911.02 (1967): "(1) On a prosecution by indictment or information the
state or the defendant may apply for removal of the cause on the ground that a fair and
impartial trial can not be had for any reason other than the interest or prejudice of the
trial judge. (2) In all criminal cases pending in any of the criminal courts of record in any
county in this state, changes of venue may be had and granted upon the same terms and
for the same reasons and grounds and in the same manner as is now provided by law for
changes of venue in causes pending in the circuit courts."
FLA. STAT. §911.05 (1967): "Where application is made for removal of the cause the
court shall hear the application and shall either grant or refuse it after considering the
facts set forth therein and the affidavit accompanying it and any other affidavits or counter
affidavits that may be filed after hearing any witness produced by either side. If the court
grants the application it shall make an order removing the cause to the proper court of
some other convenient county where a fair and impartial trial can be had."
76. Deeb v. State, 131 Fla. 362, 179 So. 894 (1937).
77. See generally Higgenbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 101 So. 233 (1924); Hewitt v. State,
43 Fla. 194, 30 So. 795 (1901); Collins v. State, 197 So. 2d 574 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
78. This was found to be true even after 97 veniremen had been rejected before the
jury was finally selected. Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254, 175 So. 213 (1937). See also Bauer v.
State, 117 Fla. 674, 158 So. 168 (1934). A change of venue was not allowed "merely" because
defendant was a Negro accused of raping a white woman. Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288
(Fla. 1953).
79. "A juror who has formed an opinion may not be challenged for cause, providing
the opinion is not positive in character, and he may render an impartial verdict. . . . In
this case, all jurors who sat stated that they had no fixed opinion as to the guilt or inno-
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change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However,
the Florida supreme court has held that "every trial court in considering a
motion for change of venue must liberally construe in favor of the defendant
any doubt as to the ability of the State to furnish a defendant a trial by a
fair and impartial jury."'' 0 Since the Sheppard decision in 1966,81 changes
in venue have been more readily allowed to avoid local prejudice caused or
manifested by pretrial publicity.8

2

If prejudicial publicity is the basis for

the change of venue, the case should be removed to a forum outside the circulation radii of local communication media and beyond the probable influence of the local press.8 3 Although more readily granted than a continuance,
a motion for change of venue is normally denied unless the existence of considerable prejudicial publicity is established. Thus, trial judges may in their
discretion rule against motions for change of venue introduced to offset the
effects of minimal publicity even though such publicity may construct a
psychological barrier to an impartial jury in that district 8 4 However, trial
judges should follow the guidelines of the Florida supreme court and liberally
grant motions for a change of venue whenever doubt exists concerning the
availability of a fair and impartial jury.
Other Remedies
An accused may waive the right to be tried by jury8 ' if, in his own competent judgment, he deems that his interests could be better protected in the
hands of the judge. 6 The right to jury trial may not be waived in capital
cases,87 however, and a waiver is not effective in any case without the consent
of the prosecutor and the sanction of the court, which must satisfy itself that
the defendant's action is voluntary, intentional, and intelligent.88 The

cence of the accused and that they could render a fair and impartial verdict." People v.
Jenkins, 10 Mich. App. 257, 260, 159 N.W.2d 225, 228 (1968).
80. Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 14 (Fla. 1959).
81. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
82. Russ, supra note 64, §3.21. See also Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951), rev'g
Shepherd v. State, 46 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1950); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959);
McCollum v. State, 74 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1954); Collins v. State, 197 So. 2d 574 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1967).
83. See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951), rev'g Shepherd v. State, 46 So. 2d 880
(Fla. 1950). See also Russ, supra note 64, §3.23. 84. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
85. FLA. STAT. §912.01 (1967): "In all cases except where a sentence of death may be
imposed trial by jury may be waived by the defendant. Such waiver shall be made in open
court . . . and signed by the defendant."

86. "fA]n accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury .....
Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
87.

FLA. STAT. §912.01

(1967), see quoted portion note 85 supra. But see FLA. R. CRUNI.

P. 1.260: "A defendant may, in writing, waive a jury trial with the approval of the court
and the consent of the state."
88. "[T]he maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body in criminal cases is of such
importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become
effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had,
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waiver must be sought in open court, and its existence must affirmatively
appear in the transcript of the proceedings.8 9 The common law view that
any waiver of jury trial violates public policy has become unsound in view
of the difficulty of overcoming the effect on juries of prejudicial publicity
stemming from coverage by modem news media. 90 Although, realistically,
even a judge may never be completely able to eliminate his personal biases,
his training and experience on the bench often render him more capable of
disregarding extremely prejudicial publicity than jurors untrained in the
law.
A further device aimed at overcoming the prejudicial effects of the jury's
exposure to news reports are cautionary instructions by the judge. 91 Courts
have assumed that cautionary instructions are effective and that jurors do
follow them. "Generally, if preventive or corrective cautionary instructions
are given, a defendant cannot claim prejudice, and it has been held that
failure to so instruct is reversible error." 92 Preventive cautionary instructions
attempt to compromise the impact of prejudicial publicity during the trial
by preventing it from ever reaching the jury.93 Corrective instructions are
designed to counteract the effects of publicity that has already reached the
jury. Where the effects of pretrial publicity are especially potent, however,
no instruction by the court can unfailingly ensure an unbiased jury. 94 Justice
Jackson, concurring in Krulewitch v. United States,95 noted that "[t]he naive
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the

in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). See also Hatcher v. United States, 352 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). See generally Note, Accepting the Indigent Defendant's Waiver of Counsel and Plea of Guilty, 22 U. FLA. L. Rv. 453 (1970).

89. If the record does not show a waiver of jury trial by the defendant, a conviction may
be reversed if the accused is not afforded a jury trial. Ivory v. State, 184 So. 2d 896 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
90. "[U]nder the rule of the common law the accused was not permitted to waive
trial by jury, as generally he was not permitted to waive any right which was intended for
his protection." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930). "The ancient doctrine
that the accused could waive nothing was unquestionably founded upon the anxiety of the
courts to see that no innocent man should be convicted." Id. at 307, citing Hack v. State,
141 Wis. 346, 351-52, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (1915).
91. These instructions merely admonish the jury not to be affected or influenced by
past news articles concerning the trial, and to refrain from reading any subsequent news
reports, listening to any radio broadcasts, or viewing any telecasts involving the case.
92.

Note, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal, 57 Nw. U.L.

REv. 217, 234 (1962).
93. "[I]t is essential to a fair trial of a defendant that the jurors should not know the
contents of, lest they take account of, such newspaper stories. . . . [I]t would have been
impossible to have cured in the mind of any reasonable juror the damage done to the
cause of .

..

(the defendant] by the statements in the newspaper articles ....

The court

may be unable to prevent the publication of such articles, but proper admonitions can
prevent their contents from coming to the attention of the jurors." Coppedge v. United
States, 272 F.2d 504, 507, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 885 (1961).
94. See Marshall v. United States, 258 F.2d 94 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S.

310 (1958).
95. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
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jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." 96

Addi-

tionally, because of pride a juror may not admit that pretrial publicity has
influenced him or he may be hesitant to admit such influences for fear of
condemnation by the court.97 Another dilemma is that cautionary instructions may, in themselves, intrigue jurors to read articles that would otherwise
have gone unnoticed. "One cannot assume that the average juror is so
endowed with a sense of detachment, so clear in his introspective perception
of his own mental processes, that he may confidently exclude even the unconscious influence of his preconceptions as to probable guilt, engendered
by a pervasive pre-trial publicity."', And, as noted above, the psychological
effect of even brief news reports may be highly significant.'"
PUNISHING THE SOURCE OF PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY-CONTEMPT

Where prejudicial publicity has occurred, contempt proceedings are
seldom utilized to punish those responsible-reporters, editors of newspapers
and other publications, or attorneys offering information to news media. 100
If a fair trial were the only issue, contempt proceedings would seem the most
pragmatic solution, since those who caused the harm, rather than the accused
or the state, would be punished. The news media, quite predictably, however,
decry this remedy as an unconstitutional violation of free speech and press. 101
With few exceptions, prior restraint of expression by the media has not been
upheld.10 2 Corrective actions, such as contempt citations' 03 that punish viola96. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
97. In one case the court inquired if any jurors had read ainarticle they had been
advised not to read. Rather than interrogate each juror privately, the judge asked: "[I]f
any juror violated the instructions of the Court and read the article . . . hold up your
hands." None of them did. Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir. 1956).
98. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112-13 (Ist Cir. 1952).
99. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
100. "Prosecuting officials, being lawyers, are strictly prohibited by Rule B, Sec. 20,
Code of Ethics Governing Attorneys, 31 FLA. STAT. ANN., from making for publication statements which pertain to pending or anticipated litigation for the reason that such statements may interfere with a fair trial." Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 16 (Fla. 1959). See
also In re Simmons, 248 Mich. 297, 226 N.V. 907 (1929).
101. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "[L]iberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by
state action." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). See also id. at 716-20. Accord,
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
102. "[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But
the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931); accord, Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Another view
holds that freedom of the press "means simply freedom from restraints prior to publication,
but with full responsibility after publication, both to the civil and criminal law, and to
the greater law that protects the integrity of the judicial machine." H. SULLIVAN, CONTEMPTr5
BY PUBLICATION 166 (2d ed. 1940).
103. "[T]he conventional power to punish for contempt is not a censorship in advance
but a punishment for past conduct and, as such . . . is not offensive either to the First or

to the Fourteenth Amendments ....

." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 290 (1941)

(dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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tion of restraining orders, may be sustained, however, where the words create
a "clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress [or the state] has a right to prevent."' 104 Such a danger may
arise when the news media prevent the "proper dicharge of judicial functions."'1 5 If the actions of the press constitute an impediment to justice, truth
is no defense to the offender.0 6 However, the Supreme Court has generally
not upheld the contempt proceedings of state courts in this area; it should
be noted that these cases have involved the prejudicial effect of publicity on
judges rather than juries.107
Although the contempt power is available to judges, it is seldom utilized.
On the other hand, pretrial orders regulating publicity are not necessarily
ineffective. For example, the order imposed in the case of James Earl Ray,
convicted slayer of Martin Luther King, seemed successful without the imposition of contempt citations."' In any event, standing orders relating to
pretrial publicity are highly desirable in that they allow contempt proceedings
for a single, initial wrong. Perhaps judicial reluctance to impose contempt
citations on the press occurs in part because judges "fear the power of newspapers. . . It affects public opinion, and therefore it controls votes ...
[IT]he popular election of judges for fixed terms is the greatest single evil in
our judicial system."10 9 Moreover, some judges may be unfamiliar with the
11°
law of contempt and thus hesitant to apply it.
A proposed statute,'"
appearing in the appendix to this note, attempts to resolve this situation by
compelling judges to issue contempt citations on a showing of prejudicial
publicity."12 The proposed statute recognizes "constructive contempt,""113 and
104. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Accord, Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
105. The quotation in its entirety reads: "There is also the conceded authority of
courts to punish for contempt when publications directly tend to prevent the proper discharge of judicial functions." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931). Accord, Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 362, 372 (1927)
(concurring opinion); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
106. "A publication likely to reach the eyes of a jury, declaring a witness in a pending
cause a perjurer, would be none the less a contempt that it was true. It would tend to
obstruct the administration of justice, because even a correct conclusion is not to be reached
or helped in that way, if our system of trials is to be maintained." Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
107. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
108. One of the few articles written at the time of Ray's trial was Huie, Why James
Earl Ray Murdered Dr. King, LooK, April 15, 1969, at 102. The court granted the author
permission to investigate the case, interview the principal characters, and publish the article.
109. Perry, The Courts, The Press, and The Public, 30 U. MIcH. L. Riv. 228, 234-35
(1931).
110. H. SULLIVAN, supra note 102, at 127.
111. Note, supra note 92, at 251-53.
112. The present Florida statute makes no specific mention of the judge's power to
issue contempt citations on an irresponsible and prejudicial news media. FLA. STAT. §38.23
(1967): "A refusal to obey any legal order, mandate or decree, made or given by any
judge either in term time or in vacation relative to any of the business of said court,
after due notice thereof, shall be considered a contempt, and punished accordingly. But
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permits publicity concerning the fact of arrest while holding other procedural
pretrial details confidential until the conclusion of the trial.'1 Because an
overly broad statute might result in unreasonable contempt citations, which
unconstitutionally limit the right of free press, the proposed statute strictly
defines the restricted areas of publicity. The five basic categories of prejudicial publicity punishable by the state are information relating to confessions, 115 unrelated criminal activities,"1 6 tangible evidence, 117 statements of
unsworn witnesses," s and proceedings from which the jury has been excluded." 9 The aforementioned information, even if true, may be prejudicial
in that it might never be introduced into evidence. The statute would help
to alleviate electoral pressures that intimidate judges, while restraining the
court from over-zealous use of the contempt power under color of a mandatory statute.
CONCLUSION
The weaknesses that plague voir dire challenges, motions for continuance,
and change of venue stein from the lack of a conclusive definition for the
term "impartial jury." This problem has been compounded by the fact that
judges have traditionally taken a restricted view of impartiality, recognizing
nothing said or written, or published, in vacation, to or of any judge, or of any decision
made by a judge, shall in any case be construed to be a contempt."
113. See generally H. SULLIVAN, supra note 102, at 6 et seq. Under a strict construction
of contempt, the court has power only if the contempt is committed within the confines
of the court. Accord Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941). See also Laski, Procedure
for Constructive Contempt in England, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1031 (1928).
114. Such contempt proceedings in criminal cases have been followed in England since
the enactment of the Law of Libel Amendment Act in 1888. The Act (51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, §3)
provides: "A fair and accurate report in any newspaper of proceedings publicly heard
before any court exercising judicial authority shall, if published contemporaneously with
such proceedings, be privileged ...... Unfair or irresponsible publications were denied
that privilege. Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 888 (1935).
115. In incidents such as confessions by "confessed killers," it is difficult to assume that
jurors will not be influenced by what they have read in the papers. Although many confessions are subsequently admitted in court, they are not to be considered by the jury until
actually presented. Cf. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Shepherd v. Florida,
341 U.S. 50 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
116. Not only are publicized reports of prior criminal activities prejudicial to the
accused, but also evidence concerning any prior criminal activities is inadmissible except
for purposes of impeachment. C. MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE §157 (1954).
117. In regard to evidence gained by illegal search and seizure, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). If the media merely report the discovery of tangible evidence without connecting it in any way to the accused, it should not be regarded as prejudicial matter.
118. The accused has the right to confront his accusers. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Even if
the person making the statement later testifies in court and is subject to cross-examination
by the defendant, the prior publicity may make it impossible to overcome the prejudice.
119. The main purpose of excluding the jury from the proceedings is to safeguard
the defendant from possible prejudice. Hence, any reporting of such proceedings prior to
the verdict would be prejudicial. Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961).
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the effects of prejudicial publicity only in cases of extremely obvious bias.
The present utilization of curative measures does not prevent the real harm
caused by media publicity. Moreover, the necessity of forfeiting the constitutional rights of impartial jury trial in exchange for a speedy trial in the
county where the alleged crime was committed seems undesirable if alternatives exist.
Publicity that is prejudicial to an accused -can usually be classified into
one of the following areas: confessions, unrelated criminal activities, tangible
evidence, statements of unsworn witnesses, and proceedings from which the
jury has been excluded. If the publicity is within one of these areas, the
trial judge should indict the responsible party for contempt pursuant to
standing court order. In addition, the judge should readily grant motions
by the defense: voir dire challenges of prospective jurors, motions for continuance, or motions for change of venue. Only in this way can an accused
overcome the prejudicial psychological effects created by even minimal
pretrial publicity and secure a truly impartial jury trial.
BRUCE A.

WEIHE

APPENDIX
AN Acr To PREVENT THE DISSEMINATION OF PREJUDICIAL PUBLICrrY1
"§1. Subject to the exceptions set forth in §§2 l(c), 2 ff2(b), [2 13(b)], [2 ff4(b)],
[2 ff5
(b)], and §3, any person responsible for the publication policy or broadcasting policy
of any newspaper, magazine, radio station, television station, or any other news-disseminating
agency which publishes or broadcasts, or any person formally connected with the administration of law, including its practice and enforcement, who divulges to any newspaper, magazine, radio station, television station, or any other news-disseminating agency, at any time
between the commission of an alleged criminal act and the termination of the trial of any
person for that act, any statement deemed in §2 of this Act to be prejudicial, shall be
-.
guilty of a
, punishable by
"§2. Any statement, whether of fact or opinion or otherwise, which communicates information of one or more of the following types, is deemed to be prejudicial:
f11. Confessions
a. That any person has confessed to any crime, or
b. The contents of any confession, or any part thereof.
c. Exception: It shall not be a violation of this statute to divulge or publish
the fact or contents of a confession after it has been admitted as evidence at
the trial.
1. Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal, 57 Nw.
U.L. R v. 217, 251-53 (1962).
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112.Criminal Activities
a. That any person officially accused of having committed any crime has ever
committed a crime on another occasion, or has been convicted of, acquitted of,
arrested for, accused of, or indicted for the commission of any other crime.
b. Exception: It shall not be a violation of this statute to divulge or publish
any statement covered by §2 112 (a) after it has been admitted as evidence at
the trial.
[ 13. Tangible Evidence
a. That any tangible evidence has been obtained, whereby such evidence reasonably tends to connect any particular person with the commission of any crime.
b. Exceptions: It shall not be a violation of this statute to divulge or publish
(1) any statement covered by §2 13 (a) after the evidence has been admitted at
the trial, or (2) that tangible evidence has been obtained, provided that
the statement does not reasonably tend to connect any particular person with
the commission of any crime.]
[ 14. Statements of Unsworn Witnesses
a. That any person is of the opinion that any particular person has committed
any crime, or
b. That any person has made a statement, whether as fact or opinion or otherwise, or the contents of any statement, or any part thereof, which (1) reasonably tends to connect any particular person with the commission of any crime
(such statements include, but are not limited to: identifications by any person of a particular person as the perpetrator of any crime; statements attributing to a particular person a motive for the commission of any crime;
statements made by a homicide victim; and results or inferences drawn from
results of scientific tests); (2) reasonably tends to discredit or otherwise impair
the defense of one officially accused of having committed any criminal act
(such statements include, but are not limited to: statements which reasonably
tend to impeach the credibility of one who has been officially accused of any
criminal act or of any person who has been or is reasonably expected to be
called to testify at the present or pending trial of the accused, or to attribute
to one who has been officially accused of any criminal act a motive for the
commission of any criminal act, or to establish the sanity of one who has
been officially accused of any criminal act.)
c. Exception: It shall not be a violation of this statute to divulge or publish any
statement covered by §2 14(a) or (b) after it has been admitted as evidence
at the trial.]
[ 15. Closed Court Proceedings
a. Transcripts, reports, or summaries of occurrences taking place during the
course of proceedings from which the jury has been excluded by the trial
court.
b. Exception: It shall not be aZviolation of this statute to divulge or publish
any statement covered by §2 15 (a) concerning a proceeding held to determine
the admissibility of evidence or of a confession after the evidence or confession has been admitted at the trial.]
"§3. General Exceptions -This statute shall not apply to:
11. The divulgence or publication, after a trial has commenced, of statements
deemed by §2 to be prejudicial, if
a. A defendant has waived his right to trial by jury, or
b. A trial court has ordered that the jury be confined during the course of the
trial.
12. The divulgence or publication, at any time after a crime has been committed,
of the fact that a particular person has been officially accused of having committed the crime."
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